The Obama Administration's actions provide, even at this early juncture of the new presidency, an excellent opportunity to consider more fully the role of transparency in government -as well as its value as a central part of a governmental reform strategy. At first blush, of course, it might seem as if there would really be little to consider. The electoral repudiation of the Bush Administration's policies, combined with the nearly universal veneration of open government as a political ideal, would make transparency seem the sweet elixir of contemporary governance. The Obama Administration's early rhetoric has only reinforced this widespread veneration of transparency. Since some governmental transparency is good, it might surely seem that greater transparency must always be better still. Yet despite nearly universal acclaim for transparency -or perhaps especially because of it -the concept and its application merits closer examination. Neither scholars nor practitioners know as much about transparency and its effects than might be supposed from the sheer popularity of the concept. What is needed is to know more about the benefits of transparency, as well as its costs. After all, it is possible to have too much of a good thing. 
Toward Transparency's Triumph
To a large extent, the prevailing triumph of transparency in the United States grows out of a rejection of both the administrative policies and rhetorical tone of the Bush administration, "one of the most secretive, closed administrations in American history," according to candidate Obama (Obama 2007) . The Bush Administration's reputation for secrecy derived in part from its posture over international and homeland security issues. But even before the Bush Administration launched its "global war on terrorism," it staked out a clear position favoring secrecy in certain aspects of domestic policymaking as well. Shortly after assuming office in 2001, for example, President Bush established an energy policy task force, chaired by Vice President Cheney, that met secretly with representatives from the energy industry, raising suspicions of undue influence and even possible violations of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. When outside environmental and watchdog groups requested materials from the task force, the White House refused to release the information, prompting the outside groups to file litigation seeking disclosure.
The Bush Administration ultimately prevailed in its position that the White House could keep secret the meetings and deliberations of its energy task force (In re:
Richard B. Cheney 2005), but politically, the die had been cast. Throughout its eight years, the Bush Administration sought to expand the power of the Presidency in ways that raised widespread anxieties about an unfettered, unitary executive. These anxieties increased each time the administration sought to keep documents from Congress or the public.
Not long after September 11, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memo encouraging executive branch agencies to think carefully before releasing information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and offering assurance that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would be inclined to defend agency decisions to withhold documents (Ashcroft 2001) . In subsequent years, reports emerged that the White House dictated which agency scientists could speak to the media about climate change, that political appointees from the White House edited agency science reports, and that on at least one occasion the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator changed his mind over an important regulatory decision due to White House pressure (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 2007; Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 2008) . As these controversies came to light, the Bush White House steadfastly resisted Congressional calls to turn over documents detailing its communications with agency officials.
In fairness, it should be noted that some of the positions on executive authority taken by the Bush Administration had been adopted by previous administrations (Calabresi & Yoo 2008) . President William Clinton, for example, took much the same legal position over the release of information about his health care reform task force that the Bush Administration took over its energy policy task force. Moreover, in other ways, the Bush Administration actually took greater strides toward transparency than did previous administrations, such as by making information available online about meetings held between outside groups and the administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) (Graham 2008) . The Bush Administration also invested significant resources and management effort in creating the Internet portal Regulations.Gov, and then in taking steps to use that portal to make available all federal agencies' supporting materials for their new rulemaking proceedings (Coglianese 2007) .
Despite efforts such as these, the Bush Administration was widely perceived as having placed a cloak of secrecy over significant aspects of the federal government's operations. Many observers undoubtedly agreed with law professor David Vladeck, who opined that "George W. Bush will go down in the annals of history as 'The Secrecy 
Transparency's Triumph
As a candidate, Obama had clearly signaled his support of open government reforms. He spoke out against dangers of special interests and called for an expansion of public access to and participation in governmental decision-making. He decried the Bush Administration's use of "a legal tool known as the 'state secrets' privilege more than any other previous administration to get cases thrown out of civil court" (Obama 2008 ). Obama promised that, if elected, he would take steps to "make White House communications public" and to "conduct regulatory agency business in public" (Obama 2008) . He favored the "use [of] cutting-edge technologies to … creat[e] a new level of transparency, accountability and participation for America's citizens" (Obama 2007 ). In a pledge his campaign referred to as "Sunlight Before Signing," he even promised to make all "non-emergency bills" available on the White House website for five days before signing them, so the public would have the opportunity to review and comment on them (Obama 2008) . issue an "Open Government Directive" specifying concrete steps to implement these values across executive agencies and departments (Obama 2009a) . In a potentially bold assertion of executive authority, the memo also stated that "independent agencies should comply with the Open Government Directive" (Obama 2009a ).
Obama's second transparency memo directed his Attorney General to develop a new FOIA policy that would clearly establish a presumption in favor of the release of government information. "In the face of doubt," Obama declared, "openness prevails" (Obama 2009b ). Furthermore, he stated that "the Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears" (Obama 2009b) . By operating under principles such as these, federal agencies would be able to "usher in a new era of open Government" (Obama 2009b ).
In addition to the two open government memos, President Obama issued two
open government executive orders on his first day. First, he revoked a Bush executive order that enabled former presidents to limit public access to their official documents.
Under the procedures outlined in Obama's new executive order, the National Archives could more easily release these historical records over the objections of a former president (Obama 2009c ). Second, Obama issued an executive order imposing ethics requirements on incoming officials and a lobbying ban on officials who leave the administration. Unlike previous presidents who had imposed similar requirements only on their most senior appointees, President Obama imposed his requirements on "every appointee in every executive agency" (Obama 2009d A month later, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued its own agency-specific transparency guidelines. The new EPA guidelines called for disclosure "wherever possible under the FOIA" and "steps to make information public on the Agency's Web site without waiting for a request from the public to do so" (Jackson 2009 ). The EPA administrator also announced that her appointment calendar would be posted daily on the agency's website.
In addition to posting government documents and data online, the Obama Administration took steps to use the Internet more interactively. For example, the administration launched the creation of Healthreform.Gov, an interactive site that includes web streaming of health care reform forums, blog postings by government officials, and a comment function that allows the public to share stories and ideas about health care. The President also held an interactive town hall via the Internet, at which he answered questions submitted and voted on by members of the public. Individuals reportedly submitted more than 100,000 questions in advance of the Town Hall, and the online community cast over 3.5 million votes on these questions (Stolberg 2009 ). Yet is transparency really the ultimate end that government should strive to serve? Rather than being valued for its own sake, transparency is actually a tool that can advance the much more fundamental goals of good public policy and legitimate governmental decision-making. Transparency can serve these larger ends in both affirmative and preventative ways. First, transparency can affirmatively improve governmental decision-making by helping inform the public about the problems governmental officials seek to solve and the options they are considering. By making more information available, the public can then participate more thoughtfully in the governmental process, sharing new information or raising questions about the adequacy of proposed governmental solutions (Stiglitz 2003) . Such informed participation by citizens, professional groups, interest organizations, and others can, in turn, help inform governmental officials and enable them to make better decisions.
Second, transparency can help preventatively, making abuses and mistakes by government officials less likely, as those officials know that ordinary citizens, organized interest groups, the media, and other government officials (especially those specifically charged with oversight roles) can more easily monitor the workings of the federal government. When officials know that those outside government can see what they are doing, they are presumably more likely to comply with norms of good governance (Coglianese, Kilmartin & Mendelson 2009 ). They may be more careful, less susceptible to expediency or improper influence, and more inclined to try to listen to all concerned.
Although transparency can act as a check on bad decision-making and help improve good decision-making, this does not mean that greater transparency is always better. Too much transparency -or transparency in the wrong places -might actually detract from officials' ability to make good decisions. One worry is that under an extreme transparency achievable today with the aid of advanced technology, officials will not engage in as probing and self-critical forms of deliberation because they know that outsiders could be monitoring everything they say and do --and perhaps will try to use against them later what they say when simply "thinking aloud." Although transparency may help inhibit undesirable forms of behavior, total transparency is also likely to inhibit other, desirable behavior -such as internal dissent or asking the proverbial dumb question -that might be embarrassing but is still necessary for good decision-making (Sunstein 2003) .
Total transparency could also make it less likely that government officials would gain useful information from private actors (Coglianese, Zeckhauser & Parson 2004) .
Certain kinds of trade secrets or other sensitive business information may be essential for government officials to obtain and analyze in order to adopt effective policies regulating industry. Clearly, businesses would be even more reluctant to share such information with government if they knew it would not only help regulators but also need to be disclosed to competitors and to the public.
Recognizing that some circumstances or types of information call for confidentiality and secrecy, even officials in the Obama Administration accept that "the disclosure obligation … is not absolute" (Holder 2009 Sound policy explanations are not the same as the kind of account that journalists or social scientists would give if they were trying to explain, as an empirical matter, why a policy was in fact adopted, an account that would clearly be aided by an expansion of fishbowl transparency. Instead, reasoned transparency depends on making a substantive evaluation of the soundness of an official's reasoning, not on knowing whether that official might have met with one interest group or another. This distinction in types of transparency is important because whenever limits need to be placed on fishbowl transparency, whether to preserve space for robust deliberation or to advance other values such as national security or personal privacy, reasoned transparency can still discipline governmental decision-making -serving the same goals as fishbowl transparency --if officials know they must provide sound reasons for their decisions. Unfortunately, the current fascination with the Internet appears to make it easy to lose sight of the value of reasoned transparency. The U.S. governmental process may well benefit even more from an improvement in reasoned transparency than from the vast expansion of fishbowl transparency that modern technology would now permit. Modern information technology may give us more noise, when what we really need is better music.
Developing open government policies is more complex than any bumper-sticker rhetoric would imply. Greater transparency -of the fishbowl variety -is not always better. In developing federal open government rules, decision-makers need to balance both the advantages and disadvantages of expanded transparency, and to consider which type of transparency (if any) ought to be expanded. Addressing these issues demands a better understanding than we currently have of how different types of, and different levels of, transparency affect governmental behavior, policy outcomes, and public perceptions of legitimacy.
Despite politicians and the public's fervor for transparency, social scientists have had much too little to say about how government officials and the public respond under different levels and types of transparency. Will greater transparency, of one kind or another, deliver more benefits than costs? This is a hard question for empirical research to address for several reasons. For one, the variable we care most about understanding -transparency --is hard to measure. What exactly does a unit of transparency look like?
In addition, the outcomes that transparency presumably affects -decisional quality and legitimacy --are also exceedingly difficult to measure, and many factors other than transparency come into play in affecting these outcomes.
Despite these difficulties, designers of open government standards -that is, legislators, agency administrators, and government lawyers --surely could demand more of the research community instead of simply relying on the assumption that greater transparency is always better. It may turn out to be the case, for example, that there are diminishing marginal returns to transparency. That is to say, when a highly secretive government makes a shift from virtually no transparency to even a modest level of transparency, the behavioral effects in terms of good governance may be much more dramatic than when an already quite open government shifts to a still higher level of transparency.
The possibility of diminishing returns is worth contemplating because, at least compared to other countries, the federal government in the United States already has quite an open public policy process --both in terms of fishbowl and reasoned transparency. Statutes such as the FOIA, Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and Government in Sunshine Act have long compelled government offices to make information available to the public and to give the public opportunities to comment on proposed policies. Even during the Bush years, the administration's critics learned much about governmental actions, not only from document "leaks" by sympathetic insiders (Roberts 2008) but also from filing FOIA requests (Kreimer 2007; Kreimer 2008 ).
In addition to laws like FOIA which enhance fishbowl transparency, long-established practices of legislative and judicial oversight have reinforced reasoned transparency.
When cabinet secretaries and agency administrators must testify before a congressional committee or respond to lawsuits filed under the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard, they must provide and defend their reasons.
Even against the existing baseline, of course, the U.S. system can always be made more transparent. Governmental reasoning could often be much stronger, and the fishbowl could be more translucent. But it will always be possible to say things could be more transparent in the fishbowl sense, at least until cameras and microphones are placed in every government office, or chips loaded in the brains of bureaucrats, with the digital data instantly uploaded to the Internet. Although greater visibility may always be possible, it may not always be needed or justified. Additional incremental increases in transparency should occur only when they will have, on balance, a positive effect on the quality or legitimacy of government decisions.
The Political Economy of Transparency
Whatever the underlying virtues and vices of enhancing still further the transparency of the U.S. federal government, it is not hard to see why, as a matter of political strategy, President Obama would want to make open government such a major theme at the start of his administration. For one thing, he presumably genuinely believes that the federal government should be more transparent. But the political economy of transparency also makes it easier for him to act on this conviction.
Advocating transparency not only distances his administration from his unpopular predecessor's, but transparency sells well. Everyone seems to favor it, whether on the political left or the right. The beneficiaries of enhanced transparency are well-organized groups of all stripes; businesses favor transparency as much as public interest groups do. Any potential losers from a new presumption of openness are generally unknown and unorganized -since they lose only when specific information is disclosed at some point in the future. Furthermore, making government information more readily available to the public requires little in the way of additional budgetary resources, and the President can announce and act on his commitment to transparency without needing congressional approval (though he would likely receive it anyway). In the short-term, then, it seems clear that President Obama had little reason politically not to declare he would usher in a "new era of open government."
In the medium to long term, though, the political calculus does not work out so clearly in Obama's strategic favor. Having emphasized transparency at nearly every turn, the President has now raised public expectations that are likely to be difficult to meet over the duration of his administration. Every time he or his cabinet resists the disclosure of government records, he risks disappointing the left and making himself vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy by the right.
In just his first few months in office, President Obama has already had to make decisions that compromise complete transparency --and afterwards he has consistently found himself subject to criticism. Candidate Obama's "Sunlight Before Signing" pledge may have set yet another unrealistically high bar, as it has been a regular source of fodder for the president's critics. Only about one out of the first dozen pieces of legislation signed by the president had been posted on the White House website for the promised five-day period of public comment (Harper 2009 ). With each piece of legislation's approval in the absence of the public comment period, the President has provided an opportunity for critics and the media to remind the public about his (unmet) campaign pledge (Henry 2009 ).
Conclusion
As a matter of political strategy, then, transparency is a double-edged sword. To be sure, the Obama Administration is already making transparency tradeoffs.
Rhetorical speeches and new websites notwithstanding, this administration appears no less prone than previous ones to protecting the opacity of internal government deliberations and to placing limits on information disclosure when officials believe doing so would serve important policy objectives. But this reality only underscores the political risk of giving transparency such prominence on a new president's reform agenda. Members of the general public, and certainly of the open government activist community, may not appreciate the full complexities of governing nor be willing to support anything less than full disclosure. Given the political risks created by heightened expectations, it remains to be seen whether Barack Obama will end his time in office having secured a reputation as the "transparency president" -or whether Americans' recently raised hopes for renewed openness in government will only turn back to renewed cynicism about government.
